UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-2-2012

Johnson v. Highway 101 Investments, LLC
Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39160

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Johnson v. Highway 101 Investments, LLC Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39160" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4023.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4023

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man dealing with his sole and separate property and NEPHI H.
ALLEN, a married man dealing with his sole and separate property, and REXBURG PLUMBING &
HEATING, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Appellants

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant/Respondent
Supreme Court Docket No. 39160-2011

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Madison County.
Honorable Dane Watkins, Jr., District Judge, presiding.

Bryan D. Smith, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Defendant/Respondent,
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq., residing at Rexburg, Idaho, for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
Kenton D. Johnson, Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man dealing with his sole and separate property and NEPHI H.
ALLEN, a married man dealing with his sole and separate property, and REXBURG PLUMBING &
HEATING, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Appellants

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant/Respondent
Supreme Court Docket No. 39160-2011

RESPONDENT'S REPl V BRIEF ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court ofthe Seventh Judicial District for Madison County.
Honorable Dane Watkins, Jr., District Judge, presiding.

Bryan D. Smith, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Defendant/Respondent,
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq., residing at Rexburg, Idaho, for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
Kenton D. Johnson, Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................ 2
STATEMENT OF CASE ...................................................................................................................3
STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................................. 3
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS ...........................................................................................................5
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL. ................................................................................................. 5
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................5
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................................... 5

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT HIGHWAY 101 MAY
USE ITS SERVIENT ESTATE IN ANY WAY AS LONG AS IT DOES NOT
UNREASONABLY INTERFERE WITH APPELLANTS' RIGHT OF WAY PRIVILEGE ................. 6

III.

APPELLANTS DO NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC 25 FOOT WIDE EASEMENT ............................... 13

IV.

THE SIGN POST AND BOLLARDS DO NOT UNREASONABLY INTERFERE WITH
APPELLANTS' RIGHT OF WAY PRIVILEGE ........................................................................ 16
A.

Appellants Admit That Highway 101's Sign Post And Bollards Do Not
Unreasonably Interfere With Their Right Of Way Privilege ................................. 16

B.

The Dimensions Of The Right Of Way Easement And Placement Of The Sign
Post And Bollards Prove That Highway lOlls Not Unreasonably Interfering
With The Right Of Way Privilege .......................................................................... 19

C.

Appellants Have Sustained No Damages By Virtue Of The Placement Of
The Sign Post And Bollards .................................................................................. 19

V.

PURPOSE IS RELEVANT IN APPLYING THE REASONABLENESS TEST ................................ 21

VI.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE ABSENT
CARELESSNESS OR RECKLESS DISREGARD ON APPELLANTS' PART ................................. 22

VII.

HIGHWAY lOllS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL ................... 24

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................26

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL - Page 1 of 26
F:\CLlENTS\BDS\8223\Pleadings\044 Responding Brief on Appeal.doc

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Pages

Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 548 (1991) .............................. 6
BHA Investments, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348,355 (2003) ....................................... 24
Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1018, 829 P.2d 1361, 1367 (Ct.App.199l) ...... 24
Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914
(Ct.App.1986) ............................................................................................................7-11,
13,15,24
Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 779 (Ct.Ap.1986) .................................................... 6, 10-11,22
Drew v. Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 540 (1999) ........................................................... 6, 7
Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078,
1085 (1979) ...............................................................................................................24
Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 518,
522 (2001) .................................................................................................................6, 11-12, 22,
25

STATUTES AND RULES:
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 ............................................................................................. 24
Idaho Code Section 12-121 ........................................................................................ 24
R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF
PROPERTY § 8.9 (1984) ............................................................................................. 6
Restatement of Property §486 (1944) ....................................................................... 6, 8
Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes § 4.9 (2000) ........................................ 6
5 Restatement of Property, Servitudes §486 (1944) ................................................. 8

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL - Page 2 of 26
F:\CLlENTS\BDS\8223\Pleadings\044 Responding Brief on Appeal.doc

STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiffs/Appellants, Kenton D. Johnson, Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing &
Heating, LLC, (hereinafter "Appellants") seek removal of a sign sitting on top

0/ a post, which

measures about 16 inches in diameter, and two bollards on each side which measure about five
inches in diameter. Defendant/Highway 101 Investments, LLC (hereinafter "Highway 101")
erected the sign post and bollards in the northwest corner of a strip of property Highway 101
owns. The strip of property is 25 feet wide and 378 feet long, and Appellants have a right of
way over the strip of property. The sign is positioned such that cars, trucks, and vans can drive
under the sign which advertises Highway 101's storage facility business located on a landlocked
property at the end of the strip of property over which Appellants have the right-of-way. The
District Court ruled on summary judgment that Highway 101's use of its servient estate by
placing the sign post and bollards on the northwest corner of the strip of property does not
unreasonably interfere with Appellants' right to use the strip of property as a "right of way."
Accordingly, the District Court granted Highway 101 summary judgment in its favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Highway 101 agrees in large part with the Statement of Facts Appellants present to the
Court. However, Highway 101 adds additional facts to bring clarity to the record on appeal.

1.

The arial view that Appellants have attached to their Opening Brief is misleading

because the view is of the top of the sign which is much larger than the sign post that the actual
sign sits on top of. For this reason, Highway 101 has attached to this brief in Appendix A
colored pictures found in the record at R Vol. ", pp. 327, 328, and 329 for ease of the Court to
get a better perspective of the actual sign post and bollards in relation to the right of way.
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2.

The sign is 20' by 10' sitting on top of an approximately 16 inch diameter post

about 14 feet above the ground.

1

2

3.

The City of Rexburg permitted Highway 101's use and location of the sign.

4.

The underlying property for the right-of-way is 25 feet wide, and the sign post

and bollards are within five to six feet of the northern boundary line leaving at least 19 feet of
space for use of the right of way.3
5.

Appellants' property that abuts the easement gives Appellants another 40 feet of

.

space to access t h err property.
6.
building.

4

There is about 59 feet between the sign post and bollards and Appellants'

5

7.

The 19 feet ofthe easement for Appellants to use for ingress and egress is wide

enough for two trucks to easily pass by each other.

6

Highway 101 has had a plat prepared to identify the location of the sign on the

8.

right of way easement? Highway 101 has attached to this brief in Appendix B the plat found in
the record at R Vol. II, p. 294 for ease of the Court to get a better perspective of the dimensions
of the sign post and bollards in relation to the right of way.

R Vol.
R Vol.
3 R Vol.
4 R Vol.
5 R Vol.
6 R Vol.
7 R Vol.
1

2

II, p.
II, p.
II, p.
II, p.
II, p.
II, p.
II, p.

257.
257.
260.
260.
260.
260.
260.

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL - Page 4 of 26
F:\CLlENTS\BDS\8223\Pleadings\044 Responding Brief on Appeal.doc

9.

Even with the sign post and bollards, there is sufficient room for Appellants'

service trucks, vehicles, UPS vehicles, and Federal Express vehicles to access Appellants'
property.8

10.

Appellants have admitted that the sign post and bollards do not unreasonably

interfere with their access to their property; nor do they unreasonably interfere with the access
of Appellants' customers, suppliers, or delivery companies.

11.

9

Appellants have admitted that they have sustained no damages by virtue of the

placement of the sign post and boliards. lO
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Highway 101 accepts Appellants' Course of Proceedings as substantially accurate and
complete.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Is Highway 101 entitled to costs and attorney's fees on appeal?
ARGUMENT

I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellants recite the applicable standard of review on appeal from summary judgment.

R Vol. II, p. 261.
R Vol. II, p. 261.
10 R Vol. ", p. 261.
8

9
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT HIGHWAY 101 MAY
USE ITS SERVIENT ESTATE IN ANY WAY AS LONG AS IT DOES NOT
UNREASONABLY INTERFERE WITH APPELLANTS' RIGHT OF WAY PRIVILEGE.
"'[A]n easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner.'" Drew v. Sorensen, 133 Idaho
534,540 (1999) (quoting Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 548 (1991))
(emphasis in original). liThe law is well settled with respect to the correlative rights of
dominant and servient owners of easements. The owner of the servient estate is entitled to
use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not materially interfere with,
the use of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate." Nampa & Meridian /rr. Dist. v.
Washington Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 522 (2001). "'The possessor of land subject to an
easement created by conveyance is privileged to make such uses of the servient tenement as
are not inconsistent with the provisions of the creating conveyance.'" Carson v. Elliott, 111
Idaho 889, 779 (Ct.Ap.1986) quoting from the Restatement of Property §486 (1944).
Stated differently, "[t]he owner of the servient estate is entitled to make uses of the
property that do not unreasonably interfere with the dominant estate owner's enjoyment of
the easement." Nampa & Meridian /rr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., supra, 135 Idaho at
522 (emphasis added); See also Carson v. Elliott, supra, 111 Idaho at 890 ("[T]he landowner is
entitled to make other uses of the property that do not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment
of the easement.") (citing R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF
PROPERTY § 8.9 (1984)). The Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes § 4.9 (2000) is in line
with these authorities. It states that "[ e]xcept as limited by the terms of the servitude ... the
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holder of the servient estate is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that does not
unreasonably interfere with enjoyment ofthe servitude." As long as the easement holder is
able to use the easement for access to his land for the specific purpose for which the easement
was granted, without unreasonable interference, he has received everything to which he is
legally entitled. Drew v. Sorensen, supra, 133 Idaho at 540.
This law is consistent with common sense and property rights. An easement holder
does not own the property underlying the easement (Le., the servient estate)-he simply has a
right to use the property he does not own for a limited and specific purpose. By giving the
easement holder a right to use the property for a limited and specific purpose, the owner of the
servient estate does not give up his right to use his property for any purpose as long as the
owner's use does not unreasonably interfere with the limited and specific purpose of the
easement. Otherwise, the easement holder (who has a limited right to use the property) could
prevent the property owner from using his property thereby gaining an equal right to the
servient estate in which the easement holder has no ownership interest but an interest only for
a limited and specific purpose.
The first Idaho case ever to apply the "reasonableness test" is Boydstun Beach
Association v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct.App.1986). In Boydstun Beach, a deed
created a beach easement (access was granted along a twenty-five foot strip) together with
boating and bathing privileges, and parking privileges along a 200 foot length of lakefront
property 75 feet wide. The Aliens bought a lakefront lot burdened by the easement and nearly
all of their yard including grass, landscaping and sprinkler system were on the lakefront
easement. The Association sought an injunction prohibiting any further interference with the
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easement and an order directing the Aliens to remove the obstructions (trees, rocks, bushes,
railroad ties, and lawn sprinklers).
The Court of Appeals began its analysis with 5 Restatement of Property, Servitudes §486
(1944). That section provides:
The possessor land subject to an easement created by conveyance is
privileged to make such uses of the servient tenement as are not inconsistent
with the provisions of the creating conveyance.
Comment:
a. Uses not inconsistent with conveyance. So far as the language of the
conveyance creating an easement precisely defines the privileges of the owner
of it, the privileges of use of the owner of the servient tenement are also
precisely defined. As the precision of definition decreases, the application of the
principle that the owner of the easement and the possessor of the servient
tenement must be reasonable in the exercise of their respective privileges
becomes more pronounced. Under this principle, the privilege of use of the
possessor of the servient tenement may vary as the respective needs of himself
and the owner of the easement vary.

Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 376 (emphasis added).
The court noted that "[u]nder §486 it is necessary to determine the precision of the
granting language. To the degree privileges are expressly granted the easement owner's rights
are paramount to those of the servient owner. These respective rights are correlative and
where the grant is general in nature the owner of the servient estate is entitled to use the
estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not materially interfere with, the use
of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate. Thus, we begin by isolating the

privileges specifically granted by the easement." Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra,
111 Idaho at 376-377 (emphasis added). "An easement owner is entitled to relief upon a
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showing that he is obstructed from exercising privileges granted by an easement." Id.
(emphasis added).
Within this framework, the court looked first to the written conveyance and found that
"the easement prohibits structures on the beach or parking space, but otherwise does not limit
the allowed privileges in location or time of use." Therefore, the court precluded a fence
erected through the 75 foot easement that obstructed parking but allowed the fence and even
a gate on the easement where they did not obstruct parking and were not on the beach
because these were "sensible," i.e., reasonable. Similarly, the court found that the trial court's
open fire prohibition was reasonable because there was no express language in the deed on
this privilege:
The rule is that, absent language in the easement to the contrary, the
uses made by the servient and dominant owners may be adjusted consistent
with the normal development of their respective lands .... Mandating the use
of roasting devices is a reasonable balance between the easement owner's
interest in picnicking and the protection and enjoyment of the servient estate.

Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 378.
But where the easement granted a privilege in express and specific rather than
general terms, the trial court could not apply the "reasonableness test" because to do
so would bypass the legal rights of the easement owners and go directly to the
equitable resolution of the parties' conflicting interests. Therefore, the trial court could
not prohibit parking on the Aliens' lawn even though it created a nuisance because the
easement expressly created a privilege to park on the entire 200 by 75 foot strip.
Similarly, the trial court could not restrict use of the easement between the hours of
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12:00 midnight and 6:00 a.m. because the easement expressly granted a privilege for
ingress and egress without such limitations.
Finally, the court reversed and remanded the case with respect to the retaining wall for
"[f]urther findings ... to determine if the wall obstructs the parking, boating or bathing
privileges granted by the easement" with specific instructions that the trial court was to
"indicate whether these findings are based on the specific language of the easement [in which
case the "reasonableness test" would not apply] or on the principles applicable to easement

granted in general terms" in which case the "reasonableness test" would apply. Boydstun
Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 379 (emphasis added).
The rules announced in Boydstun Beach Association are simple and straightforward.
The court looks first to the written instrument itself to identify the privilege granted in the
deed. If the deed grants the privilege in express and specific terms, the court cannot apply
"equitable principles" or what is reasonable under the circumstances. But if the deed grants a
privilege in general terms, the court allows the proposed use of the servient estate as long as
the proposed use is reasonable in view of the privilege granted in the deed. Finally, none of
these rules involves a "bright line test" like the one Appellants urge this Court to apply.
The next Idaho case to apply the "reasonableness test" was Carson v. Elliott, supra, 111
Idaho at 889 (Ct.App.1986). Carson involved an obstruction placed in a right of way easement.
The court upheld the trial court's removal of a raised garden placed in the "eye" of the circular
end of the single driveway providing access to two homes. In so doing, the court noted the
following:
Because an easement authorizes limited use ofthe strip of property, the
landowner is entitled to make other uses of the property that do not
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL - Page 10 of 26
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unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the easement .... Whether a
particular use by the landowner is an unreasonable interference with enjoyment
of the easement is a question of fact.
Carson v. Elliott, supra, 111 Idaho at 890 (emphasis added).
The record contained substantial evidence that "the operation of vehicles had been
hindered by the garden. Carson's cars and a boat occasionally required the extra room in the
circle's center to turn around. These vehicles sometimes struck the raised garden." Carson v.
Elliott, supra, 111 Idaho at 891.
The court in Carson never identified whether the privilege the deed granted was
express and specific or general. Instead, the court simply said that "Carson enjoys an
easement to use the driveway./I However, the reason the court found against allowing
the continuation of the raised garden was that it unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff's use of her easement to use the driveway. The important point is that the
court applied a "reasonableness test," not a "bright line test" on whether the raised
garden would stay or go.
This Court has also applied the "reasonableness test" in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation
District. v. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 Idaho at 518 to an express 40 foot
easement. At issue in Nampa was whether Washington Federal Savings could erect a fence and
sidewalk within an irrigation district's lateral maintenance easement. The irrigation district
claimed that Washington Federal Savings could not install the fence and sidewalk within the
easement.
This Court began its analysis by citing to Carson and Boydstun Beach as well-settled
Idaho law on the issue:
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The law is well settled with respect to the correlative rights of dominant
and servient owners of easements. The owner of the servient estate is entitled
to use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not
materially interfere with, the use of the easement by the owner of the
dominant estate. In other words, the servient estate owner is entitled to make
uses of the property that do not unreasonably interfere with the dominant
estate owner's enjoyment of the easement. Thus, an easement owner is entitled
to relief upon a showing that he is obstructed from exercising privileges granted
in the easement."

Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. V. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 Idaho
at 522-523 (emphasis added).
The court then applied the law to the trial court's findings and conclusions agreeing
with the trial court as follows:
Because NMID failed to show that the sidewalk and proposed fence
would unreasonably interfere with its easement, the district court denied
NMID's injunction, holding that Washington Federal was entitled to construct
the sidewalk and fence.

Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. v. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 Idaho
at 521 (emphasis added).
In short, this Court found that "NMID's activity will be so infrequent that its easement

rights will not be unreasonably interfered with" and affirmed the trial court's order allowing
for the installation of the fence and sidewalk. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. V.

Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 Idaho at 522 (emphasis added).
Appellants cite to several cases from other jurisdictions to support their position against
a reasonableness test. Appellants argue that this Court should overrule the district court and
adopt a bright line/per se test to easements irrespective of whether they are specific. The
District Court appropriately declined Appellants' similar invitation: "After reading the parties'
briefs and conducting additional research, this Court finds it unnecessary to consult the laws of
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foreign jurisdictions .... On numerous occasions subsequent to Boydstun Beach, the appellate
courts of Idaho have addressed the rights and privileges of servient estate owners. This court,
however, is not aware of any Idaho case that has applied something other than the
reasonableness test."ll
Instead, the District Court applied Idaho law and looked to the deed itself to determine
whether the privilege granted in the conveying deed is express and specific or general in nature
and properly concluded the following:
Plaintiffs' are entitled to full enjoyment of the privilege granted them by their
Easement, and Plaintiffs are entitled to relief upon showing they are obstructed from
exercising that privilege.
The privilege created by the Easement is {a right-of-way,' or the right to use the
Strip of property for ingress and egress. The legal description contained in the granting
language precisely describes the location of the land upon which Plaintiffs can exercise
that privilege. Thus, while the location ofthe Easement is precisely defined, the
privilege is stated generally as a {right-of-way.' This Court concludes Highwway 101 has
the right to use its servient estate (the Strip of property) in a manner that does not
unreasonably interfere with the Plaintffs' right to use the Strip of property as a {right-ofway.,12
Accordingly, the District Court next considered whether Highway 101's use of its property
unreasonably interfered with Appellants' right of way privilege.
III.
APPELLANTS DO NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC 25 FOOT WIDE EASEMENT

Underpinning Appellants' entire argument is their position that they own an express and
specific 25 foot wide easement. They argue that since they have an express and specific 25 foot
wide easement, the District Court could not apply a reasonableness test and "shrink" the 25
feet to 19 feet. However, Appellants confuse the concept of "express" with "specific":

11
12

R Vol. ",, pp. 423-424 (emphasis added).
R Vol. ",, pp. 426-427 (emphasis in original).
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Although Appellants have an express right of way, Appellants do not have an express and

specific 25 foot wide right of way.
The deed by which Appellants acquired their property states:
ALSO, A right-of-way to be used in common with others described as
follows:
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 17, township 6 North,
Range 40 East, Boise Meridian, Madison County, Idaho; thence East
140.90 feet; thence North 565.74 feet to the true point of beginning; and
running thence North 89°49' 50" East 378.37 feet; thence South 25.00
feet; thence South 89°49' 50" West 394.40 feet; thence North 3r37' 44
13
East 29.74 feet to the point of beginning.
Although the deed description does not specifically state "over the property described as
follows," such language is implied because the description is a metes and bounds legal
description of the property over which the easement runs and not a description of the
easement itself. Moreover, it is the same description used in the fee simple transfer of the
property to Highway 101.
Since the right of way was granted in writing it is "express." However, since it is merely
describes a "right of way" and not a "25 foot wide easement," it is a general privilege and not a
specific one. Significantly, the conveyance does not read a "25 foot wide right of way" nor does
it contain any prohibitions in it to any other uses. Any other reading would give Appellants a
fee simple interest in the property rather than a right to traverse the property at issue.
Since Appellants do not have an express and specific 25 foot wide easement, the District
Court's decision did not shrink their easement. Appellants assert that "The district court ruled
that the location of the right is more than is necessary - Johnson and Allen do not need the full

13

R Vol. II, p. 256.
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25 feet set out in their deeds.,,14 The Memorandum Decision and Order in this case makes no
such statement or findings. Appellants make that assertion only to liken this case to Boydstun

Beach Ass'n v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 370, and to support their argument that the District
Court here-like the trial court in Boydstun Beach-committed reversible error by impinging
upon their alleged express and specific 25 foot wide easement.
Were the deed meant to grant an express and specific 25 foot wide right of way, it
would simply have said "a 25 foot wide right of way." To get around this point of fact,
Appellants for the first time assert that "Johnson and Allen, and numerous prior owners of the
parcels, purchased their property in reliance on the existence of the 25 foot right-of-way
conveyed by their deeds. illS Appellants raise this issue for the first time on appeal. Moreover,
there is no evidence in the record to support it. The deed simply grants a general right of way
to cross over the strip of property that is about 25 feet wide and 378 feet long to access
abutting properties. Appellants argue that the right of way is not limited to ingress and egress
or access to their property. However, Highway 101 submits that a right of way granted to an
adjoining property owner serves no purpose other than to provide ingress and egress or access
to his property. Additionally, in this case, such general right was granted to be used in common

with others. No other reasonable interpretation exists other than ingress and egress for a right
of way privilege if it is to be in common with others.
If this Court were to take Appellants' argument to its logical conclusion, anyone else's
use ofthe easement would amount to an obstruction to Appellants. In fact, Appellants
themselves, by leaving vehicles parked on the easement for extended periods of time, would be

14
15

See p.10 of Appellants' Brief dated May 24,2012.
See pp. 10-11 of Appellants' Brief dated May 24,2012.
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guilty of obstructing the easement because "the others" who share the right of way easement
would be deprived of using the exact area under the parked vehicle even though they could use
the easement for a right of way by going around the parked vehicle. The underlying premise of
Appellants' argument, that Appellants own an express and specific 25 foot wide easement, is
not grounded in either logic or fact.
At bottom, the conveyance does not read a "25 foot wide right of way" or expressly
state that Appellants have the specific right to use the entire width of their easement as a right
of way or any other restricting language. The deed simply gives Appellants a general privilege
over the described property for a right of way. Therefore, although Appellants have an express
easement, it is not an easement of a specific width or length, and therefore a general privilege
for a right of way over the described property. When dealing with a general privilege, the law
in Idaho requires the Court to look at whether the proposed use unreasonably interferes with
the privilege granted in the deed conveying the easement.
IV.
THE SIGN POST AND BOLLARDS DO NOT UNREASONABLY INTERFERE WITH
APPELLANTS' RIGHT OF WAY PRIVILEGE.

A.

Appellants Admit That Highway 101's Sign Post And Bollards Do Not
Unreasonably Interfere With Their Right Of Way Privilege.

Appellants were given a right of way easement that allows them to cross over the
servient estate for access to their property. This means that as long as Appellants are able to
use the servient estate for access to their land without unreasonable interference, they have
received everything to which they are legally entitled. In other words, as the owner of the
servient estate, Highway 101 has the right to use the property underlying the right of way
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easement in any manner it sees fit so long as it does not unreasonably interfere with the
Appellants' use of the right of way easement over the property.
Here, both Nephi Allen (Allen)16 and Kenton Johnson (Johnson) testified that the sign
post and bollards do not unreasonably interfere with their use of the right-of-way easement:
Q. The poles or those bollards, do they prevent you from accessing your

property?
A. No.
Q. So you can still access the property where the Rexburg Plumbing and Heating
is located?
A. Yes.
Q. Let's just talk generally about that. In terms of accessing your property, what
kind of vehicles do you use to access your property? In other words, I'm
assuming that you've got plumbing trucks, and HVAC trucks, and maybe a boom
truck -- I don't know what you've got. So just tell me what do you use to access
the property?
A. We have service trucks, we have a forklift, we have delivery trucks, various
UPS, Federal Express.
Q. What was that last one?
A. Federal Express. Just normal everyday usage.
Q. And is there anything about the location of the pole and these bollards that
prevent any of these service trucks, delivery trucks, forklifts, or any UPS or
Federal Express vehicles from accessing your property?
A. No.
Q. Over the easement?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Would you then agree that notwithstanding the fact that there's a
pole and two bollards, your equipment, your service vehicles can still access your
property on the easement using the easement?
A. Yeah.17

***
Q. Let's talk about how this placement the pole and the two bollards interfere
with your ability to use the easement to access your property. Can we do that?
A. It doesn't interfere with it.
Q. It doesn't interfere, does it?
A. Huh-uh.

16
17

R Vol. II, p. 26l.
R Vol. II, pp. 304-305.
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Q. Is that a -A. No, sir.
Q. No interference, does it?
A. No interference.
Q. The fact is that -A. It doesn't interfere with ability to get in and out of there. It doesn't interfere
with the professional truck driver's ability to get in and out of there .... 18

***
Q. Well, can you tell me when it was you tried driving a piece of equipment
over the easement and didn't have enough room, 19.34 feet was not enough
room to cross the easement -A. No.
Q. Let me finish. To cross the easement to access your property?
A. No. I can't tell you when.
Q. It's never happened, has it?
A. No.
Q. In fact, given the Department of Transportation specifications on how wide
vehicles can be, cars are really not much wider than our trucks. They're
approximately eight, eight and a half feet, correct?
A. True.
Q. And so you could actually have two trucks passing in the 19.34 foot space and
still be totally on the easement, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And so there is sufficient room for you, and your service people, and delivery
people, and customers to use the easement to access your property?
A. Yes, sir. There is today.19
In short, Appellants have admitted that the sign post and bollards do not unreasonably
interfere with their access to their property; nor do they unreasonably interfere with the
access of the Appellants' customers, suppliers, or delivery companies.

18

19

R Vol. II, p.319.
R Vol. II, p.320.
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S.

The Dimensions Of The Right Of Way Easement And Placement Of The
Sign Post And Sollards Prove That Highway lOlls Not Unreasonably
Interfering With The Right Of Way Privilege.

The right of way easement is on property that is about 25 feet wide.

20

The sign post and

bollards are within five or six feet of the northern boundary line leaving at least 19 feet of space
for use of the right of way easement.

21

The Appellants' property that abuts the right of way

easement gives the Appellants another 40 feet of space to access their property.22 Thus, there
is about 59 feet between the sign post and bollards and Appellants' building.

23

The 19 feet of

the right of way easement for Appellants to use for ingress and egress is wide enough for two
trucks to pass by each other.

24

Thus, there is sufficient room for the Appellants' vehicles,

trailers, customers and delivery vehicles to access Appellants' property.25

C.

Appellants Have Sustained No Damages Sy Virtue Of The Placement Of The Sign
Post And Sollards.

As further evidence that the sign post and bollards do not unreasonably interfere with
Appellants' right of way easement, neither Allen nor Johnson were able to identify a single
customer or sale that they have lost due to the existence of the sign post and bollards. Thus,
not only has Highway 101 not unreasonably interfered with Appellants' right of way easement,
Appellants have sustained no damages. Allen and Johnson testified as follows:
Q. All right. Can you identify one customer who has not engaged in a purchase

or has not done business with Rexburg Plumbing because the sign and the
bollards are located where they are?
26
A. I cannot.

20

21
22
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24
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26
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***
Q. And then it [the complaint] says, "If allowed to remain, the sign will injure

plaintiff's business." What injury will the business suffer if the sign is allowed to
remain?
A. Well, we believe that those customers that you alluded to earlier that we
can't name, we believe that they don't come back and visit us ever again.
Q. Okay. Now, wouldn't you agree that that's based on speculation?
A. Sure. Certainly.27

***
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Okay. Well, are you claiming that the business in this case

has been damaged because of the sign? Have you lost any sales?
A. I am not claiming that. I have no knowledge of that.
Q. What about you personally, are you claiming you have suffered any money
damages as a result of the sign being placed on my client's property.
. 28
A. N0, sIr.

***
Q. In your complaint, you say that "If allowed to remain, the sign will result in

loss of property to the Plaintiff." Can you identify what the loss of property is
that you will lose if the sign is allowed to remain?
A. For sure the spot the sign is on.
Q. All right. Anything else?
A. I feel at jeopardy.
Q. Okay. And let's go back to the spot the sign is on, okay?
A. Okay.
Q. You don't actually own that property, do you?
A. No, sir.
Q. You just have an easement to be able to use it to access your property,
correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you've already admitted that you don't have to drive over that spot to
access your property, do you?
A. No, sir.
Q. So you really don't lose your right to access your property ifthe sign is
allowed to remain, do you?
A. Not today.29

27
28

R Vol. II, p. 309.
R Vol. II, p. 321
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***
Q. Okay. What facts did they give you, besides their opinion, that you need to

sue in this case to protect that 16 inches where the pipe is and the five inches
each for the bollards or you will, on a more probable than not basis, suffer some
property damage? What facts do you have?
A. I don't have any facts to that they didn't say you will, they said you could.
Q. Okay. So again, they're speculating, too, because they don't know.
A. That's probably true.
Q. SO when it boils down to it, your biggest concern in this case is really based
on the absence offacts, but on speculation.
A. Yeah.
Q. And as you sit here, you can't identify one customer who has not done
business with your business, this Rexburg Plumbing, because of the location of
the sign?

. 30
A . N 0, sIr.

In short, Appellants have failed to identify any damages resulting from the
placement of the sign post and bollards. The only "damage" they could identify is that
they cannot use the space occupied by the 16 inch sign post and the five inches for each
ofthe bollards. However, Appellants do not own this property and have no right to
occupy it because the space occupied by the 16 inch sign post and the five inches for
each of the bollards does not unreasonably interfere with the Appellants' right of way
easement.

V.
PURPOSE IS RELEVANT IN APPLYING THE REASONABLENESS TEST

Appellants claim that the purpose for their right of way easement is irrelevant.
However, Idaho law requires that the Court determine whether Highway 101's use of its

29

30

R Vol. II, pp. 321-322.
R Vol. II, p. 322.
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property unreasonably interferes with Appellants' use. This necessarily requires that the Court
consider the purpose for which Appellants have an easement. The Court cannot judge whether
Highway 101's use of its property unreasonably interferes with Appellants' use unless the Court
considers the purpose of Appellants' use. In Nampa, Appellant also argued that the sidewalk
and fence would make any possible future cleaning out with heavy equipment difficult if not
impossible. The Court responded by looking at how the repair and maintenance had actually
been done, noting that within the past 20 years the maintenance and repair of the ditch had
been limited to burning the grass and weeds on the ditch bank with the use of a pick-up truck
and tank of propane. "While past use does not necessarily mean that NMID will never employ
heavy equipment to clean or repair the lateral, it does suggest that NMID's activity will be so
infrequent that its easement rights will not be unreasonably interfered with." Nampa &
Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., supra, 135 Idaho at 523.

VI.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE ABSENT
CARELESSNESS OR RECKLESS DISREGARD ON APPELLANTS' PART

There is ample evidence in this case that the sign post and bollards do not unreasonably
interfere with access to Appellants' property or Appellants' use of the right of way. In an
attempt to controvert this evidence, Appellants claim that "the sign is hit regularly, and
particularly when drivers are attempting to turn around or back out of Rexburg Plumbing and
Heating.,,31 Appellants are trying to make their case like the circular driveway in Carson where
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the raised garden bed unreasonably interfered with the
general easement because cars would hit the raised garden bed.

31

See p. 16 of Appellants' Brief dated May 24, 2012.
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The District Court properly concluded that "even if presumed true, that fact would not
render the placement of the sign and bollards unreasonable when there is ample evidence that
delivery trucks, service vehicles, and customers have all be [sic] able to access Appellants'
property without unreasonable difficulty."32 Moreover, in Carson the extra room in the circle's
center was required to turn around. Drivers did not strike the raised garden just because they
were not paying attention. They had no choice if they wanted to turn their vehicle. Here,
according to Nephi Allen, drivers like himself have embarrassingly struck the sign post and
bollards in plain sight not because they had to in order to turn their vehicles, but because they
were not paying attention.

20
Q. So were you embarrassed when you hit the
21 bollard?
22
A. I tried to get out of there pretty quick.
But were you embarrassed?
24
A. Yeah. I looked around.
25
Q. So you were embarrassed?
1
A. Yeah.
2
Q. Why?
3
A. It's embarrassing.
4
Q. Is that because it's in such plain sight
5 you shouldn't hit it?
6
A. Maybe 33
23

Q.

25

Q. Shouldn't they be looking and not hit

***
1 the sign?
34
2
A. They should.

32
33
34

R Vol. III, p. 429.
R Vol. II, pp. 517-518
R Vol. II, p. 518.
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VII.
HIGHWAY lOllS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

Highway 101 requests costs in accordance with I.A.R. 40{a} which provides that II[C]osts
shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law
or order of the Court." In addition, Highway 101 is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal
because Appellants' appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.
This Court has stated:
Idaho Code Section 12-121 provides that '[i]n any civil action, the judge may
award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties .... ' Such an award
is appropriate when this Court has the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Minich v. Gem State
Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 {1979}. Where the issues raised
on appeal involve well-settled principles of law, the appeal is frivolous and without
foundation. See Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1018,829 P.2d 1361, 1367
{Ct.App.1991}.
BHA Investments, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 355 {2003}. In Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho
1012,1018 {Ct.App.1991}, the Idaho Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees to respondents
on appeal because appellants "made no substantial showing that the district court misapplied
the law" and the area of law was "well-settled."
Appellants cite to several cases from other jurisdictions to support their position against
a reasonableness test. However, the Appellants completely ignore the Nampa case and other
well-settled Idaho law regarding the reasonableness test. The District Court correctly ruled that
"After reading the parties' briefs and conducting additional research, this Court finds it
unnecessary to consult the laws of foreign jurisdictions .... On numerous occasions
subsequent to Boydstun Beach, the appellate courts of Idaho have addressed the rights and
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privileges of servient estate owners. This court, however, is not aware of any Idaho case that
has applied something other than the reasonableness test.,,35
Appellants' argument that it simply disagrees with the District Court's decision is
without foundation, especially in light of the fact that the law in Idaho is well-settled regarding
the reasonableness test. Thus, this Court should award attorney's fees and costs to Highway
101 on appeal because appellants made no substantial showing that the district court
misapplied the law, and the "reasonableness test" is an area of law that is well-settled in Idaho.

See Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. v. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 Idaho at
518 where this court stated "The law is well settled with respect to the correlative rights of
dominant and servient owners of easements. The owner of the servient estate is entitled to
use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not materially interfere

with, the use a/the easement by the owner of the dominant estate (emphasis added.)
CONCLUSION
Appellants argue that this Court should not apply the reasonableness test that Idaho has
applied uniformly. Appellants are asking this Court to turn a blind eye to whether Highway
101's use of its property is reasonable asking the Court instead to apply a bright line/per se test
that Idaho does not follow and grant them more property rights than they have bargained for

35

R Vol. III, p.423-424 (emphasis added).
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and are entitled to. For all of the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the District
Court's granting summary judgment and award Highway 101 its costs and attorney's fees.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED Ihis;2lJt:!:;;UIY, 2012.
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